Five Years, $900M Lost, and an AM Empire That Never Was
On May 27, 2026, Nano Dimension (Nasdaq: NNDM) announced it had entered into a definitive agreement to sell Markforged, Inc. to Stratasys Ltd. (Nasdaq: SSYS) in an all-cash transaction valued at $42.5 million. The deal is expected to close in the second half of 2026.
But to understand what this transaction truly means, you need to go back to 2020. This sale is not an isolated event. It is, for now, the final stop in a five-year chain of ambition and failure.
What Is Nano Dimension, and What Happened Over Five Years?
| Period | Event |
|---|---|
| End of 2019 | Cash of just $4 million. A small Israeli company focused on electronics-grade additive manufacturing, largely unknown outside niche circles. |
| 2020–2021 | Riding the AM bubble and a surging stock price, CEO Yoav Stern launched a series of At-The-Market (ATM) equity offerings. With virtually no revenue, the company accumulated $1.36 billion in cash. At this point, Nano Dimension was effectively a treasury with a printer attached. |
| 2022–2023 | Smaller acquisitions began: Admatec, DeepCube, Fabrica. Then in 2023, Stern made his boldest move: an attempted takeover of Stratasys itself. Starting at $18 per share, he raised the offer three times, reaching $24. Stratasys’ board rejected every approach unanimously, declaring the offers “substantially undervalue the company” and not in shareholders’ interests. |
| July 2024 | Announced acquisition of Desktop Metal ($179.3M). |
| September 2024 | Announced acquisition of Markforged ($116M). With all three companies combined, Stern’s vision was complete: a vertically integrated AM platform spanning polymers, metals, and software, with combined revenue of $340 million. The dream was to become the one-stop leader of the AM industry. |
| December 2024 | Activist investor Murchinson Ltd. (7.1% stake), after more than two years of legal battles and shareholder campaigns, succeeded in removing Stern from the board at the annual general meeting. On December 26, Stern’s termination as CEO was announced. Murchinson had consistently argued that both acquisitions were “overpriced and misguided” and that management was using shareholder cash to build a personal empire. |
| March 2025 | The Delaware Court of Chancery ordered Nano Dimension to complete the Desktop Metal acquisition. Nano Dimension had attempted to walk away, but Desktop Metal sued, and the court compelled the deal to proceed. |
| April 2, 2025 | Desktop Metal acquisition completed ($179.3M). |
| April 25, 2025 | Markforged acquisition completed ($116M). Cash fell sharply from $840M to $551M. |
| July 28, 2025 | Desktop Metal filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, just 117 days after the acquisition closed. Core assets were ultimately sold for $7 million, less than 4% of the acquisition price. |
| Full Year 2025 | Impairment losses of $139.4M related to Desktop Metal. Net loss reached $293.6 million for the year. |
| April 2026 | The AME (Additively Manufactured Electronics) and Fabrica product lines sold to Inspira Technologies for up to $12.5 million. |
| May 27, 2026 | Markforged sold to Stratasys for $42.5 million, just 36% of the $116 million acquisition price. |
Acquisitions, Divestitures, and What Was Lost
Acquisition and Divestiture Summary
| Asset | Acquired For | Sold For | Loss | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Desktop Metal | $179.3M | $7M | ~$172M | Filed for bankruptcy 117 days after acquisition |
| Markforged | $116M | $42.5M | ~$73.5M | Sold for 36% of acquisition price |
| AME / Fabrica | Undisclosed | Up to $12.5M | Undisclosed | Sold to Inspira Technologies |
Nano Dimension Cash Position Over Time
| Period | Cash | Key Event |
|---|---|---|
| End of 2019 | $4M | Pre-growth small company |
| End of 2020 | $671M | ATM equity offerings begin |
| End of 2021 | $1.36B | Peak cash position |
| End of March 2025 | $840M | Just before major acquisitions |
| End of June 2025 | $551M | Both acquisitions completed |
| End of December 2025 | $460M | Post-Desktop Metal bankruptcy |
| 2026 (post-sale, est.) | ~$500M | After Markforged divestiture |
From peak to present, Nano Dimension has lost approximately $900 million in cash in under five years. For shareholders, this is nothing short of extraordinary.
The Vision and the Moment It Collapsed
Stern’s vision was a vertically integrated AM platform. Nano Dimension would contribute precision polymer and electronics printing. Desktop Metal would bring metal AM via binder jetting. Markforged would add continuous fiber-reinforced composites and metal. Together, they would offer materials, hardware, and software under one roof, serving defense, aerospace, healthcare, and automotive customers. A one-stop AM company for every industry.
The vision required all three pillars to stand. When Desktop Metal filed for bankruptcy just 117 days after closing, the middle pillar collapsed. The AM empire fell before it was ever built.
One question is worth asking. Did Desktop Metal truly “fail,” or was something else at play?
Before the acquisition closed, Desktop Metal’s finances were already in serious distress: monthly cash burn of several million dollars, over $100 million in unsecured debt, and more than $40 million in legal fees alone. Nano Dimension had tried to walk away from the deal. Desktop Metal sued. A court ordered the acquisition to proceed. Then, 117 days later, Desktop Metal filed for bankruptcy. The result: Nano Dimension’s shareholders absorbed approximately $172 million in losses, while Desktop Metal’s creditors received some recovery. Whether this outcome was by design cannot be proven, but the pattern is difficult to ignore.
A 2023 Rivalry, and a 2026 Reversal
In 2023, Nano Dimension tried to acquire Stratasys. It raised its offer three times, reaching $24 per share. Stratasys rejected every approach, calling the bids a substantial undervaluation.
Three years later, that same Stratasys is acquiring Nano Dimension’s subsidiary Markforged for $42.5 million.
The company that tried to buy Stratasys is now selling to it. Few reversals in the AM industry have been this complete.
Why Stratasys Bought Markforged, and Why the Metal AM Stayed Behind
Stratasys’ rationale for the acquisition is straightforward. In the continuous carbon fiber-reinforced polymer AM segment, Markforged and Stratasys have long been the two dominant players. Chinese competitors are beginning to emerge, but the competitive advantage in this space still belongs largely to these two companies. For Stratasys, this deal was more than an asset purchase. By absorbing a direct competitor, it secured Markforged’s technology, brand, and installed base of over 15,000 systems, all for $42.5 million. Without Nano Dimension’s missteps, this asset would not have been available at this price. Acquiring a rival while strengthening its own position: a textbook case of one move serving two purposes.
Stratasys’ consistent focus on polymer AM is evident from its acquisition history: Origin Laboratories (2020, P3 photopolymer technology), RPS (2021, industrial SLA), Xaar 3D (2021, SAF powder bed fusion), Covestro AM business (2023, resin materials and hundreds of patents), Forward AM Technologies (May 2025, SAF and DLP materials), and Nexa3D (June 2025, high-speed resin printers). Every one of these moves has reinforced its position in polymers and composites.
The metal AM market is already crowded with established players including EOS and Nikon SLM Solutions, alongside fast-rising Chinese competitors BLT, Farsoon, and Eplus3D. Entering that market from a position of weakness would make little strategic sense. Nano Dimension has announced it will “retain” the Markforged Metal Binder Jetting product line, but a more accurate reading may be that Stratasys simply declined to take it. There is no obvious reason for Nano Dimension to hold onto a standalone metal AM business either.
Shareholder Revolt and the Question of Accountability
Nano Dimension’s current major shareholders include Murchinson Ltd. at 7.4% (approximately 15.55 million shares), Anson Funds Management at approximately 9%, and Boothbay Fund Management at approximately 3.5%. Institutional investors collectively hold around 33%, with the remaining 66% held by retail investors.
Murchinson has argued consistently since 2022 that both acquisitions were overpriced and strategically misguided. The results have proven them right. Desktop Metal went bankrupt. Markforged was sold for 36 cents on the dollar. Nearly $900 million in cash has disappeared in under five years.
Murchinson is on the move again. On May 19, 2026, it filed a Schedule 13D/A demanding a special general meeting of shareholders. It criticized the board for making “minimal progress” over eight months of strategic review, and announced an investor call for June 3, 2026. Nano Dimension’s board pushed back, accusing Murchinson of attempting to seize control of the company without paying a control premium.
The board’s position may have legal merit. But the results speak for themselves. Before asking who should control the company, the market will want answers on how nearly $900 million in shareholder capital was lost in the first place.
Phase 3: What Is Nano Dimension’s Next Move?
Nano Dimension is currently executing a three-phase strategic plan. Phase 1 focused on cost reduction and operational efficiency. Phase 2 focused on monetizing product lines to strengthen the balance sheet. The Desktop Metal bankruptcy, the AME and Fabrica divestitures, and this Markforged sale all fall under Phase 2. Phase 3 is focused on evaluating strategic alternatives to maximize long-term shareholder value. That is the official language. The real question is what it means in practice.
Nano Dimension has engaged two advisors: Guggenheim Securities to handle the monetization of remaining product lines, and Houlihan Lokey to evaluate options related to the company’s financial resources and public company platform. The division of responsibilities is telling.
Once the product lines are gone, what remains is a NASDAQ listing and approximately $460 million in cash. For a private company seeking a public market listing, this is an extraordinarily attractive vehicle.
This is where the concept of a reverse merger becomes relevant. A reverse merger is a transaction in which a private company merges with an already-listed public company, gaining stock exchange access without going through the time and cost of a traditional IPO, which can take years and cost tens of millions of dollars. The listed entity effectively becomes a shell, or vehicle, for the incoming private company. For any well-positioned private firm that wants NASDAQ access, Nano Dimension’s combination of listing status and nearly half a billion dollars in cash could be a compelling offer.
The likelihood of this scenario is reinforced by the company’s shareholder base. Murchinson, Anson Funds Management, and Boothbay Fund Management are all hedge funds. These are investors who prioritize asset monetization over long-term operational growth. For them, a reverse merger that drives up the share price represents a rational exit. The composition of the shareholder register itself may be pushing the company in this direction.
An AM company that once dreamed of becoming the industry’s one-stop platform may end up becoming something else entirely. Murchinson’s warnings turned out to be correct. But being right does not bring back the $900 million. And the current management has yet to show what Phase 3 will actually deliver.
AM Insight Asia Perspective
This is not just the story of one company’s failure. During the AM bubble of 2020 to 2022, Western AM companies raised hundreds of millions of dollars through SPACs and equity offerings and went on acquisition sprees. Desktop Metal, Markforged, Velo3D: all listed on NASDAQ with fanfare, each positioned as a reshaper of the industry. Many of them are now being forced to liquidate the excess. They danced, and now they are leaving the stage.
While that was happening, Chinese competitors were quietly building real capability. BLT, Farsoon, and Eplus3D stayed out of the headlines. They focused on technology and manufacturing scale. Today, their metal AM systems are widely regarded as competitive with Western equivalents, and they are shipping into global markets. While Western players were consumed by internal turmoil, Asian manufacturers were accumulating strength.
Nano Dimension is not alone in suffering the consequences of the AM bubble. Whether the painful period of consolidation and survival is nearing its end, or whether more is still to come, remains to be seen. What can be said with confidence is that the Asian market is watching closely to see who is still standing when the dust settles.
